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Abstract. No less than in agriculture,  industrialization  in Africa is difficult  to explain on purely 
economic grounds. This paper applies public choice theory to some of the most paradoxical 
aspects of  technology and industrialization  in one African country,  Tanzania. Our analysis turns 
on two assumptions about bureaucratic behavior in that country: The first is that bureaucrats 
have preferences defined over projects rather than technologies and the second is that, in their 
capacity as managers of state-owned  enterprises, these agents of the state have sought to initiate 
as many new projects as possible, mainly on the basis of foreign aid. These propositions are 
shown to be consistent with evidence regarding the growth of the public sector in Tanzania 
during the 1970s and 1980s. 
1.  Introduction 
The public choice approach has already been used in the African context to 
explore the political rationality of policies that seem difficult, if not entirely 
impossible, to justify on purely economic grounds. A  well-known study by 
Robert Bates  (1981),  for example,  sought to explain why governments in 
Africa tend to  adopt agricultural policies  that are blatantly harmful to the 
interests of most farmers in the region. More recently, rent-seeking behavior 
has  been  used  by  Gallagher (1991)  to  explain  variations  in  growth  rates 
across a wide range of African countries. What has not been applied to any 
of those countries, however, is the area of public choice theory that deals 
specifically with the preferences and behavior of government bureaucrats: 
the so-called political economy of bureaucracy. Yet, as we shall argue below, 
this important strand of the public choice literature helps to explain some of 
the most paradoxical aspects of technology and industrialization in the public 
sector of one particular African country, Tanzania. 
More specifically, our argument will be that these paradoxes can be explained 
by the following propositions.  The first is that, contrary to what is almost 
always assumed in the literature on development economics, bureaucrats do 
not in fact have preferences defined over technologies (that is, they do not 
choose technologies in the usual sense of the word). Rather, their preferences 376 
are thought to be defined over projects and particularly those projects that 
enable the institutions to which they belong, to grow as rapidly as possible. 
2.  Technological behavior in the public sector -  two paradoxes 
To a much greater extent than elsewhere in the Third World, the industrial 
sector in Tanzania (as in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally) is dominated 
by enterprises owned by the state and to a correspondingly greater extent 
than in the other regions, therefore, the technological aspects of industrial- 
ization in Tanzania need to be understood in relation to the behavior of those 
enterprises. 1 
This understanding is made more difficult, however, by several paradoxical 
features of public sector behavior in the industrial sector of that country. 
One such paradox is the marked discrepancy between actual technological 
behavior in the public sector and the behavior that would have been consistent 
with the particular type of socialism pursued by Tanzania since 1967. For, 
whereas that type of so-called 'African socialism' laid considerable emphasis 
on small-scale, labor- and local-input intensive technologies, the public sector 
has tended instead to use technologies with precisely the opposite features 
(that is, large-scale, capital- and import-intensive technologies). What is just 
as paradoxical, however, is that this apparent preference for certain types of 
technologies has not been uniformly applied across the public sector. Indeed, 
one can also find examples in the public sector of precisely the opposite forms 
of technological behavior from those that have just been described. In some 
cases, these pronounced technological variations occur even within the same 
sector at around the same point of time. 
2.1.  The first paradox: Planned versus actual technological behavior in the 
public sector 
In order to make this first paradox as clear as possible, it is necessary to recog- 
nize that socialism in Africa after independence took a number of different 
forms. The first form, known as African socialism, is associated mainly with 
the governments of Nyerere in Tanzania and Nkrumah in Ghana during the 
1960s. This form of socialism has been described as 'Afrocentric' and 'non- 
aligned', in that i  t purported to be adapted specifically to African conditions 
(Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild, 1988:  150). African socialism 
needs to be contrasted with the 'Afro-Marxist'  type of model that emerged 
in countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia during the 1970s. In 
these and other countries that formed part of the 'second wave' of socialism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Rosberg and Callaghy, 1979), the distinctiveness of the 377 
African situation tended to be rejected in favor of the established principles 
of scientific socialism (that is, of Marxist-Leninism). 
This distinction is important because it bears so heavily on the type of 
technology that the developing country is predisposed to select. Whereas 
socialism of  the Marxist-Leninist variety demands the most modern, advanced 
technologies, this is not at all true of  the African socialism that was practised in 
Tanzania after 1967. Immediately after the Arusha Declaration, for example, 
President Nyerere (1968b: 98-99) made his position clear when he argued 
that "even when we are building factories which serve the whole nation, 
we have to consider whether it is necessary for us to use the most modern 
machinery which exists in the world. We have to consider whether some older 
equipment which demands more labor, but labor which is less highly skilled, 
is not better suited to our needs, as well as being more within our capacity to 
build and use." There were indeed many cases, he believed, where the needs 
of society could better be met by labor-intensive, small-scale technologies 
than by large-scale mass production. These cases, furthermore, were closely 
in accord with his view that industry should be decentralized to the maximum 
possible extent. "In so far as there is a choice, we in Tanzania would infinitely 
prefer to see many small factories started in different towns in our country 
rather than one big factory started in any one of them" (Nyerere, 1968a: 107). 
These early ideas were consistent with and indeed embodied in the key 
planning documents that were to form the basis of Tanzania's industrialization 
strategy in the post-Arusha period. The second Five Year Plan, covering the 
years 1969 to 1974, for example, not only provided explicit encouragement 
of labor-intensive techniques, but also emphasized the importance of more 
decentralization and more effective linkages between large and small-scale 
industries (ILO, 1982). 
For the period after 1974, the so-called 'basic industry strategy' strongly 
reaffirmed the principle of self-reliance, which played so central a role in 
the Arusha Declaration and in subsequent policy pronouncements by the top 
political leadership. This goal was to be achieved, among other ways, by the 
encouragement of a local capital goods industry which would lessen Tan- 
zania's dependence on imports of foreign technology. Moreover, the major 
objectives laid down by the 'basic industry strategy', such as employment  cre- 
ation, equality of income distribution and dispersion of industry, suggested 
implicitly or explicitly that where a choice existed, technologies should gener- 
ally be relatively low-cost, labor intensive, simple and small-scale (Williams, 
1976). 
Beginning in the 1970s, however, a long list of scholars in Tanzania and 
elsewhere pointed out that the technologies actually being used in the public 
sector, typically had just the opposite features. That is to say, they were usual- 378 
Table I. Alternative rice-milling  technologies 
Initial  Total capital  Benefit-cost 
fixed cost  Shs.  per  ratio 
(shs. 000)  worker hour  Shadow prices 
full capacity 
Rice huller 
4-8 tons per day  93.0  2.4  7.94  a 
Rice roller 
24 tons per day  1,752.5  14.3  2.52 
60 tons per day  4,410.0  11.9  1.69 
120 tons per day  7,927.0  16.7  1.52 
% tons per day. 
Source: Bagachwa  (1992: Tables 1 and 5). 
ly large-scale and inefficient, as well as being capital- and import intensive.  2 
As such, therefore, these technologies also tended to have the effect of cen- 
tralizing, rather than decentralizing the location of industry in Tanzania. Far, 
therefore from promoting the most important goals of the state, public enter- 
prises in the industrial sector seemed to be doing just the reverse. It was not 
that there were no choices available to the managers of state-owned enterpris- 
es. On the contrary, over a wide range of manufacturing industries, a number 
of very different technological alternatives usually presented themselves. 
Table 1, for example, shows that the available techniques for rice-milling 
range from a small-scale huller (producing 4  to 8 tons per day) to a large- 
scale roller (producing 120 tons per day), with the investment requirements 
per worker of the latter exceeding those of the former by a factor of around 
7.  Table  1 also shows that the estimated benefit-cost ratios vary inversely 
with the scale of the different techniques: the rice huller has the highest ratio 
of benefits to costs while the rice roller has the lowest ratio. If the choice 
of the former could thus have been justified on the grounds of employment 
creation and efficiency,  it was also preferable from the standpoint of industrial 
decentralization and self-reliance. Although one might have expected these 
considerations to prevail in the light of our earlier discussion, the state-owned 
milling corporation chose instead to expand its capacity on the basis of the 
large-scale (120 tons per day) roller technology. 
Given the overriding importance that was apparently attached to the need 
for self-reliance in the period after 1967, one would also have expected state- 
owned enterprises such as the milling corporation, to pay explicit attention to 
the acquisition of technological capabilities of various kinds. For there was 
certainly no lack of awareness on the part of national planners that a strategy 379 
of self-reliance had necessarily to be based on the substitution of domestic 
for foreign technological capabilities (an awareness that was perhaps most 
clearly articulated in relation to the 'basic industry strategy' in the 1970s) and 
the public enterprise, as an extension of the state, ought, one would think, 
to have been a key instrument in effecting that transformation. In practice, 
however, not only has there tended to be an increase rather than a decrease 
in the public sector's reliance on imported technology but also a tendency 
for that technology to  supplant rather than to  stimulate the acquisition of 
indigenous technological capabilities (Wangwe, 1986,  1992). 
2.2.  A second paradox: Pronounced technological variations in the public 
sector 
Though these various departures from what one would have expected well 
describe the technological behavior of the vast majority of firms in the public 
sector, they do not describe all of them. Indeed, one can also find examples 
in the public sector of precisely the opposite forms of technological behavior 
from those that have just been described. And especially when these pro- 
nounced technological variations occur within the same sector at around the 
same point in time, the possibility of a second paradox emerges, namely that 
the state holds inconsistent technological preferences -  preferences, that is 
to say, which, under similar conditions, lead to the choice of different tech- 
nologies. Formally, the paradox arises in that the state's preferences for such 
sharply diverging methods of production need to be represented by intersect- 
ing rather than non-intersecting indifference curves and the former unlike the 
latter violate the transitivity assumption of traditional micro-economic theory 
and welfare economics. 
Two examples describe this paradoxical type of behavior especially clearly. 
Research on Tanzania's textile industry, for example, has revealed a very wide 
range of factor intensities among state-owned enterprises and in some of those 
enterprises the choice of  technology was made at approximately the same time 
and under similar conditions (see below). The other example comes from the 
brick-manufacturing industry, where, "The [Tanzania] state has been involved 
in technological development, as well as in innovation. But what is especially 
interesting about this is the diversity of state actions. Two very different types 
of technological choice have been made by the 'same' state, one of  an almost 
unbelievably inappropriate nature, the other much more relevant" (Kaplinsky, 
1990:  93). 
Mainly because it is the better documented of the two examples, we shall 
use data from the textile industry to illustrate the apparently inconsistent- and 
hence paradoxical -  nature of the state's technological behavior. In particular, 
we shall confine ourselves to a comparison between two large-scale integrated 380 
textile mills, that, in spite of having been established more or less simulta- 
neously at the end of the nineteen sixties by the same public institution, the 
National Development Corporation, nevertheless exhibit a number of rather 
remarkable technological (and other) variations. The one plant, for example, 
is highly labor-intensive whereas the other is highly capital-intensive. The 
one textile firm is one of the most efficient in the entire industry, whereas 
the other performs poorly on virtually all the usual indicators. In the one 
enterprise, indigenous technological capabilities were successfully acquired, 
while in the other they were not. 
Still another case that is  difficult to reconcile with the general pattern 
of technological behavior in the public sector is  to be found in the farm 
implements sub-sector. For, there is one state-owned enterprise in that sector, 
that has used relatively simple labor-intensive technology (in conjunction 
with other factors) to attain a highly competitive position (as measured by 
domestic resource costs) (World Bank, 1987). 
This firm is also unusual in the rapidity with which it was able to dispense 
with foreign technical expertise -  that is, in the rapidity with which it was 
able to acquire indigenous technological  capabilities of various kinds (Barker, 
Mitschke-Collande, Bhagavan, and Wield, 1986). 
3.  Existing explanations and their limitations 
The earliest and most detailed attempt to explain the foregoing paradoxes was 
made by David Williams (1976) with particular reference to the textile indus- 
try. He showed, among other things, that the pronounced disparity between 
the technologies chosen in the industry could not be explained on the basis of 
the existing literature on the choice of technology in developing countries. It 
is often argued in this literature, for example, that technological differences 
between firms reflect differences in the types of products they manufacture 
(where differences refer to variations in the characteristics that the various 
products embody). In particular, it is commonly argued that labor-intensive 
technologies tend to produce goods with a higher proportion of functional 
or 'low-income' characteristics than capital-intensive techniques. Williams 
(1975: 3), however, found "no grounds for assuming that any particular type 
of technology in the observed range was dictated by product characteristics." 
Nor was he able to find much evidence in support of another well-known cat- 
egory of explanations in the choice of technology, namely, those that impute 
various types of non-economic preferences to decision makers in developing 
countries. Perhaps the best known of these explanations is the 'engineering- 
man' hypothesis advanced by Louis Wells (1975). His contention, in brief, is 
that under conditions of imperfect competition the preference of 'engineering- Table 2. A comparison of two textile plants 
Friendship  Mwanza 
Capital cost up to 1969 
(million shillings)  61.5  106.5 
Production of woven fabrics in 1975 
(million linear metres)  24.0  22.5 
Number of employees  in 1975  5057.0  2486.0 
Profit in 1975 
(million shillings)  2.8  2.3 
Cost of carded cotton in 1973 
(shillings per tonne)  2512.0  2910.0 
Labour hours per tonne of 
carded cotton in 1973  247.0  98.0 
Source: Coulson (1982). 
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man' for sophisticated automated technology and modem products dominates 
the concern of 'economic-man'  to minimize costs of production. Yet, while 
there were certainly enough departures from perfect competition in Tanzania's 
textile industry at the end of the nineteen-sixties to enable 'engineering-man' 
to hold sway, one would then have expected a uniform bias in favor of capital- 
intensive techniques rather than the co-existence of techniques with markedly 
different factor intensities,  as is most clearly illustrated by the comparison 
between the two textile mills (see Table 2 above). As Williams (1975: 7) puts 
it, "The engineering-man hypothesis would not predict that a single investor 
... would set up both capital-intensive and labour-intensive plants at the same 
time." The same problem, one should note, would apply just as much to the 
various other technology-related objective functions that have been proposed 
in the literature,  such as for example, the sense of 'national pride'  which is 
sometimes said to be evoked by the use of the most modem technologies in 
developing countries (Winston,  1979). 
3.1.  Project versus technological preferences 
For this reason, Williams (1976) suggests that one should investigate instead 
the nature of non-technology related objective functions in the public sector. 
He argues that managers are concerned essentially with projects rather than 
technologies  and  that  they  are  especially concerned  with  maximizing  the 
number of projects that can be initiated and implemented. 
In seeking to meet this  goal,  managers  tended to favor highly packaged 
projects -  a tendency that was already present among parastatals  by virtue 
of skill constraints  and by lack of information  about technology and other 382 
markets. The main reason being that highly packaged projects generally also 
offered distinct advantages not just in terms of finance but also in terms of 
the relative ease and brevity with which they were able to be implemented (as 
is perhaps most obviously the case with turnkey projects). In fact, "a project 
package which included financing and which was 'ready to go' would often 
be accepted with little question" (Williams, 1976:  163). 
What evidence is available does tend to support the view that public enter- 
prises favor packaged projects, at least in comparison with comparable pri- 
vately owned firms. A  study of public and private sector industrial projects 
by Wangwe (1986), for example, found that it is mainly in the public sector 
that turnkey projects have been adopted in Tanzania. 
Under these circumstances, so the argument goes, the 'choice of technique' 
is just the 'fall-out' or residual from the particular package of foreign finance 
and other related project inputs that happen to be chosen. What seems to 
be decisive in this process, which, one should emphasize, actually excludes 
technological issues from the purview of the typical project, is not the value 
of one project in relation to others (as measured by the major development 
goals), but rather the demands made by each of them on scarce equity finance. 
For their part,  "The parastatals  responded to  the bureaucratic realities by 
presenting projects in a manner best calculated to ensure acceptance. Thus, a 
low-cost labor-intensive textile mill, completely financed outside the budget 
would be preferred to any mill for which more financing from the budget were 
required. But if circumstances were such that the more acceptable package 
available consisted of a high-cost capital intensive mill, then that would be 
chosen" (Williams, 1976:  165). 
Let us now consider how this observation can be applied to the concrete 
case of the two textile mills that were established, as noted earlier, at more or 
less the same time by the National Development Corporation. 
3.2.  A comparison ofihe two textile plants 
Table  2  above sets  out the main technological differences between these 
two factories. It shows that the one plant, Friendship, is considerably more 
labor-intensive than the other plant, Mwanza, using as it does two and a half 
times as many workers per unit of output, together with an appreciably lower 
amount of capital. In circumstances where labor is comparatively cheap, as 
in Tanzania, it is not surprising that the labor-intensive alternative should be 
the more profitable of the two textile technologies, as shown in Table 2. 
What then were the particular circumstances that surrounded the more or 
less  simultaneous selection by the same public sector institution  of these 
two factories? Friendship, it seems, was originally conceived after high-level 
political contacts between the People's Republic of China and Tanzania and 383 
the project was financed entirely by a long-term interest-free loan from the 
Chinese government. Because the proposed textile factory was both politically 
sanctioned and externally financed it was approved without much ado. And 
the technology that resulted from this externally financed project in no way 
reflected any technological concerns on the part of the Tanzanian bureaucracy, 
whose objectives tended to be defined purely in terms of projects. Rather, the 
technology that was  'chosen' for the Friendship project appeared to reflect 
instead the conditions in the supplying country and in particular the fact that 
the Chinese were familiar with older and relatively labor-intensive vintages of 
textile technology (indeed, the particular vintage used at Friendship happened 
to be the most labor-intensive of the technologies that were being produced 
at the time in China).  A  year later,  by contrast,  a  very different -  albeit 
perhaps equally attractive -  package of project characteristics presented itself 
to the Tanzanians in the form of the Mwanza textile mill. One reason why 
this project differed from the Friendship case was that it was financed by 
a supplier's credit rather than by bilateral foreign aid. The most important 
difference, though, was that the financial source of the project was located 
mainly in France rather than in China and 'the latest and most automated 
equipment' used at Mwanza, tended accordingly to reflect conditions in the 
former rather than the latter country. 
It is thus by defining bureaucratic objectives over projects that Williams 
is able to resolve the second paradox. For the seemingly inconsistent tech- 
nological preferences are replaced in his framework by a consistent set of 
project-related preferences, from which technological outcomes are derived 
rather than chosen. What this framework is unable to clarify, however, is the 
first of the two paradoxes described above. For whereas that paradox has 
to do with both an observed bias towards large-scale, capital-intensive and 
inefficient  techniques and a systematic tendency towards sophisticated, 'high- 
income' products, Williams (1976) argues instead that the factor intensity of 
technologies associated with packaged, externally-financed projects would 
be randomly distributed; that is, that there would be no systematic bias in any 
one direction. 
This particular weakness of the approach, however, can be overcome by 
a more realistic analysis of the relationship between the sources of external 
finance and the types of industrial technology that have been transferred to the 
public sector in Tanzania. For one thing, even after the Arusha Declaration 
in that country, most of the foreign finance supplied to the public sector 
originated in the developed market economies (and took the form mainly 
of foreign aid, as shown in Table 5 below). And the types of products and 
processes associated with this type of finance are not randomly distributed, 
but are instead closely reflective of the socio-economic conditions prevailing 384 
in the supplier countries (especially a relative scarcity of labor, high average 
incomes and large markets)) On the other hand, though, when foreign finance 
originates instead in developing countries, the same historical line of argument 
leads one to expect the transfer of relatively appropriate forms of technology, 
an  expectation that was  clearly  met in the case  of the Friendship textile 
mill and also in the case of the labor-intensive farm implements enterprise 
referred to earlier. For in the latter case as well, what mattered was not "that the 
Tanzanian side took any greater degree of interest in the choice of technology 
than in any other project" (Barker et al., 1986: 123), but rather that the finance 
was provided by the Chinese who (as in Friendship) favored relatively simple 
technology. 
By thus combining the basic insight provided by Williams -  that managers 
seek to maximize external project finance -  with a historically oriented view 
of how this behavior leads  to particular technological outcomes, one can 
account for much of what seems paradoxical about the behavior of state- 
owned enterprises in Tanzania. Yet, for all its centrality to this composite 
argument,  the  foreign-exchange maximizing behavior by  the bureaucracy 
remains  far from well understood. Most importantly, it is not at all clear 
how this behavior actually enters the utility function of the manager of a 
public enterprise. What is lacking in other words is a  detailed analysis of 
bureaucratic  objectives  and  an  assessment of the  manner in  which those 
objectives  are  furthered by  foreign-exchange maximizing behavior in  the 
public sector. Though it was not designed to address this particular question, 
we shall now argue that the public choice approach to bureaucracy nonetheless 
throws considerable light on it. 
4.  The public choice approach to bureaucracy 
The public choice approach to bureaucracy emphasizes the multiplicity of 
ways in which an expansion of the size of an institution promotes the particular 
interests of its members. In so doing, we shall argue, this approach provides 
precisely what was missing from the previous section, namely, an analysis 
of how the maximization of foreign exchange (and more generally budget 
maximization) promotes the objectives that were really pursued by managers 
of state-owned enterprises. 
Although  an  early  contribution  by  Downs  (1967:  17)  had  emphasized 
how "The expansion of any organization normally provides its leaders with 
increased power, income and prestige" and how those persons would there- 
fore tend to favor organizational growth, the specific notion of a  'budget- 
maximizing bureaucrat'  is most closely associated with William Niskanen 
(1973). The latter makes essentially two claims, the first of them being that 385 
the manager of a public bureau has the following among his major goals: 
"salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output" 
(1973: 22). Niskanen's second major claim is that since these goals are all 
assumed to vary directly with the size of the budget, the aim of the bureaucrat 
can be reduced to one of maximizing this financial variable during his time 
in office. This time element bears emphasizing in part because most of the 
gains that accrue to the budget maximizing bureaucrat "are nearly unrelated 
to the 'net worth' of his organization after his departure" (Niskanen, 1973: 
33) and in part because his tenure in office itself may be relatively short in 
many developing countries. 
5.  Foreign-exchange maximizing bureaucracy and the political 
economy of Tanzania 
It is easy to show that these goals find frequent expression in the writings 
of political scientists who work on Sub-Saharan Africa in general and on 
Tanzania in particular. Indeed, one of those goals, bureaucratic power, is one 
of the most pervasive themes of that part of the political science literature 
which deals with the post-independence period in Africa. After noting how 
the phenomenal growth in the size of the civil service in Tanzania (and else- 
where) created "a privileged group" with "corporate interests of its own" 
and with considerable opportunities for "personal aggrandizement", Chazan 
et al., (1988: 53) for example, are not alone in suggesting that the bureau- 
cracy  "emerged as  the core of a  new dominant class  in the postcolonia! 
period." Moreover, in its analysis of how the economic and political power 
thus acquired by the bureaucracy is exercised, the political science literature 
almost uniformly assigns a paramount role to patronage, another of the goals 
emphasized by Niskanen (1973). 
There is, however, only one study which deals with the political economy 
aspects  of the growth in the public sector in Tanzania and which, at the 
same time, analyzes the role played by foreign-exchange maximization in 
that growth. This study (Mukandala, 1988) takes as its point of departure the 
notion that since 1969 the "political stratum" of the Tanzanian state has been 
locked in an intense and prolonged conflict with the "managerial stratum" 
of the state (where the former category refers essentially to those who make 
or design policy and the latter refers largely to those who actually carry it 
out). It is not that there were no parastatals in Tanzania prior to the Amsha 
Declaration, but it was only in the years thereafter, where the parastatal sector 
had emerged as a "strategic and complex branch of the state" (Mukandala, 
1988: 29) that the political and managerial strata came into direct and open 
conflict. For by then, following an  extraordinarily rapid increase in their 386 
numbers and their net assets (see Table 3 below) parastatals had become "too 
big, diverse and strategic to be left to the managerial stratum yet proved too 
difficult to control through conventional government methods" (Mukandala, 
1988:  29).  It  was  already all  too  plain,  for example, that  the parastatals 
were behaving less like vehicles in the transition to socialism and more like 
'bastions of capitalism', with only a very tenuous connection to the political 
institutions of the state. What particularly concerned the 'political stratum, 
was the National Development Corporation (NDC), which accounted for no 
less than half the total investment by parastatals in new firms and which was 
in control of the majority of the state's assets in manufacturing and other 
sectors of the economy. (So rapid in fact was the growth of this institution 
that its total net assets almost doubled over the period from 1967 to 1969.) 
The 'political stratum's' response to this situation was the introduction of 
a  series of measures whose objective was to  limit the degree of freedom 
then being  enjoyed by the parastatal  sector as  a  whole and the NDC  in 
particular. These measures marked the beginning of what has been described 
as the 'rationalization' phase in the parastatal sector (Mukandala, 1988:  29). 
According to one such measure, for example, particular groups of parastatals 
were to be placed under the control of newly created parent ministries. Other 
measures involved a heavier degree of reliance on some parastatals (such as 
the National Price Commission and the Bank of Tanzania) in the regulation 
of other parastatals and a strengthened role for central ministries (such as the 
Treasury and the Ministry of Development  Planning). By far the most extreme 
of all the measures employed by the 'political stratum' after 1969, however, 
was the attempt at 'rationalization' of the parastatal sector. What was intended 
by this was basically the fragmentation of the then existing corporations into 
increasingly smaller units, in the hope that they would thereby become less 
powerful and more manageable. 
The policy of rationalization did produce some results: between 1971  and 
1974, for example, the NDC was stripped of 17 of its operating companies and 
19 of its projects. On the whole, though, these and other attempts to limit the 
rapidly growing influence of the 'managerial stratum' met with only a very 
limited degree of success. To some extent this was a reflection of a somewhat 
predictable set of administrative and logistical problems (predictable because 
the relatively scarcity of administrative resources must have been apparent 
right at the outset of Tanzania's attempted transition to socialism). To a large 
extent, however, the failure of the political stratum to achieve its objective 
was  due to  the  vigorous  counter-measures that  the parastatal  institutions 
themselves undertook. 
It is  in these measures and their outcomes that one finds rather striking 
support for a public choice interpretation of  bureaucratic behavior in Tanzania, 387 
for what  occurred was  a  particularly clear demonstration of the political 
advantages that accrue from an increase in the size of a public institution. 
Consider from this point of view Mukandala's telling description of how the 
parastatal sector as a whole responded to what, in the guise of rationalization, 
was  nothing less  than  a  familiar  'divide and rule'  tactic by the  'political 
stratum'. Thus, 
On the one hand the managerial stratum established new subsidiary com- 
panies to replace those hived-off by the state ... This was deemed neces- 
sary because the more subsidiaries a corporation had, the bigger it was 
and consequently a) more resources were allocated to it in the national 
budget for developmental purposes; b) the more bargaining power it had 
when negotiating for higher salaries (especially for its management). Size 
showed "umuhimu" or importance relevance; c) strengthened its hand in 
mobilizing external finance on its own... 
External finance was  also useful because once obtained,  it  assured 
approval for the projects from the Treasury, the Bank of Tanzania and 
the Ministry of Development Planning. Foreign capital's need to invest in 
new projects rather than expanding or rehabilitating o!d ones reinforced 
this trend (Mukandala, 1988:  32). 
From the perspective of a sector engaged in a straggle for its very survival, 
therefore, what seemed to matter much more than its efficiency  or profitability 
was its size andpower. And it is from these political points of view, we suggest, 
that the central role of new projects and foreign capital needs to be understood. 
To what extent then did the public sector actually grow in Tanzania? Table 3 
provides evidence on this question for the manufacturing sector, while Table 
4 refers to the public sector more generally (in both cases the data cover the 
period from the 1960s to the early 1980s). As one would expect, the figures 
in the tables  show a  marked growth in the public sector after the Arusha 
Declaration. For there was then a greatly enhanced need for civil servants 
and  other officials to  run  the institutions  that  had just  been  nationalized 
(Mukandala,  1985).  What  is  remarkable though is  that  the public  sector 
continued to grow very rapidly after the early post-Arusha period, when no 
such obvious need for personnel was apparent and at a  time when in fact 
the 'political stratum' of the state was bent on reducing the sector's size and 
power. Between 1971  and 1981/2, for example, public sector fixed assets in 
manufacturing grew more than three-fold, while the share of public enterprises 
in manufacturing value-added almost doubled (see Table 3). 
These pronounced increases in the absolute and relative size of the public 
sector were closely related to the external sector, for in the "frantic spate of 
subsidiary creation" referred to above, "there was a renewed aggressiveness 388 
Table 3. The growth of the public sector in manufacturing 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Public sector  Public sector  Share of public  Share of public 
fixed assets in  employment in  sector in manu-  sector in manu- 
manufacturing  manufacturing  facturing  facturing value- 
employment  added 
(million shillings)  (absolute numbers)  (per cent)  (per cent) 
1966  21.0  a  2,330  5.0 
1967  5,300  15.5  14.0 
1971  971.0  20,113  46.4  29.0 
1979  2,851.0  53,000  50.0  31.0 
1980  50.0  37.1 
1981  3,278.4  47.7  48.2 
1982  52.7  56.8 
aRefers to 1964. 
Sources: Col. (1) from World Bank (1988: 4); Col. (2) from Perkins (1980), Clark (1978) 
and World Bank (1987); Col. (3) and Col. (4) from Skarstein and Wangwe (1986). 
Table 4. The growth of public sector in general 
Established posts  Total number 
in the  of parastatals 
civil service 
1966  65,708  43 
1967  80,239  73 
1971  99,564 
1980  295,342  380 
Sources: For column 1) Mukandala (1985) and 
for column 2) de Valk (1992). 
toward recruiting foreign project partners; the call for self-reliance notwith- 
standing  ...  This in turn led to a faster increase in the importation of capital 
rather than intermediate goods and over-installation of new industrial capaci- 
ty" (Mukandala,  1988:  128-129). Tanzania's increasing reliance on imported 
capital goods over this period was to a large extent made possible by growing 
amounts  of foreign  aid,  which,  as Table 5  shows,  financed an ever-greater 
proportion of gross investment and government expenditure. 
The effect of all  of this  activity  on the  technological  dimensions  of the 
industrialization  process was hardly  surprising.  On the one hand,  the pow- 
erful political pressure to grow as a  means of institutional  survival, with its 
attendant dependence on external sources of finance, meant that little time was Table 5. The growth of external sources of finance 
389 
Total aid  Total aid as percen-  Share  of foreign 
(million US  tage of monetary  financing  in govern- 
dollars)  gross investment  ment expenditure 
1960s  30-35 
1970  29.9  11.4 
40 
1975  114.9  25.3 
45 
1980  493.6  46.6 
1982  514.9  54.3  50 
Sources: Col. 1) Skarstein and Wangwe (1986); Col. 3) Wangwe (1992). 
available to public sector managers for consideration of factors such as labor- 
intensity,  self-reliance  and  industrial  decentralization,  that  were described 
earlier as being important to the 'political stratum.'  Nor was there time for 
undertaking the various types of effort (such as search activities) on which 
the  acquisition  of local  technological  capabilities  is  known  to  depend.  A 
management or technical collaboration agreement with a foreign partner for 
example was much more likely to have been seen by the parastatal as a way of 
overcoming short-run skills constraints on its expansion (via projects), than 
as an issue which carries important long-run implications for the acquisition 
of technological capabilities in the public sector. On the other hand,  in  its 
neglect of the managerial function the parastatal was further contributing to 
the inattention paid to capabilities issues, because it was effectively ignoring 
the range  of issues that bear on technological learning  and mastery at the 
operational level (that have to do, for example with project implementation, 
repair and maintenance). 
5.1.  The size of the public sector under structural adjustment 
If the  public  sector in  Tanzania  continued  to  grow rapidly  into  the  early 
1980s, in spite of attempts to curb its size and power, it has also managed to 
withstand the privatization schemes and other measures that were introduced 
a few years later by the World Bank, as part of the wider process of structural 
adjustment. 
On the one hand, some notable increases in the absolute size of the sector 
were recorded in the period after the reforms were introduced (that is, after 
1986). The total number of state-owned enterprises, for example, grew from 
380 in 1980 to 425 in 1988, 4 while the civil service as a whole increased in 
size by more than 5 per cent over the period 1985-92. 5 On the other hand (and 390 
Table 6. The public sector share in Tanzania  before and after  structural adjustment 
Share of state-  Share  of state-  Share  of state-  Share of state- 
owned enterpri-  owned  enterpri-  owned  enterprise  owned  enterpri- 
ses in GDP  ses in non-agri-  investment  in  ses in employ- 
cultural econo-  gross  domestic  ment 
mic activity  investment 
1978-85  10.8  18.1  24.6  22.3 
1986-91  13.7  23.8  30.0  22.3 
Change  +2.9  +5.7  +5.4  0.0 
Source: World Bank (1995). 
relatedly), some recently-published  World Bank data show that with respect to 
most macro-economic variables, the public sector share increased rather than 
decreased in the reform period, as compared with the seven previous years. 
In particular, one can see from Table 6 that the state-owned share of the GDP, 
non-agricultural activity and gross domestic investment actually increased in 
the later period, while its share in employment remained unchanged between 
the two periods. 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  sought to  explain  several of the  most paradoxical 
aspects  of technology and industrialization in Tanzania, since the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967.  Our explanation has turned mainly on two assumptions 
about bureaucratic behavior in that country: the first is that bureaucrats have 
preferences defined over projects rather than technologies and the second is 
that in their capacity as managers of state-owned enterprises, these agents 
of the state have sought to initiate as many new projects as possible, mainly 
on the basis of foreign aid. Such behavior, we suggested, was rooted in a 
political context where the drive to institutional expansion was viewed as 
a key element in the survival of the bureaucracy. It meant that the various 
branches of the public  sector continued to grow very rapidly well beyond 
the early post-Arusha years, when there had been an initial need for large 
numbers of extra civil servants to manage and run the newly nationalized 
industries. In fact, as we showed in a number of tables, the public sector 
grew very rapidly throughout the 1970s  and early 1980s, at a time when the 
'political stratum' of the state was bent on reducing its size and power. It also 
meant that during the period of structural adjustment reforms, which began a 
few years later in 1986,  the public share of most macro-economic variables 
increased rather than decreased. 39l 
Notes 
1.  For details see James (1995). This book was the first attempt to apply public choice theory 
to African industrialization in general. 
2.  This was already clear from Clark's (1978)  study of the period from  1964 to 1973. He 
pointed to a "failure of the post-Arusha companies to distinguish themselves significantly 
and favourably from the pre-Arusha companies" (Clark, 1978: 140) and he concluded that 
"There has been as yet no developmental innovation on the part of parastatals to make 
themselves more consistent with the Tanzanian ideology" (Clark, 1978: 140). Some years 
later, a very detailed study by Perkins (1980,  1983) of more than 300 firms in ten industrial 
sectors arrived at a similar conclusion, namely, that despite the existence of efficient labor- 
intensive technologies and "Despite the rhetoric, Tanzania's industrialization program has, 
in general promoted the establishment of [publicly owned] enterprises using large-scale 
capital-intensive, often technically and invariably economically inefficient technologies" 
(Perkins, 1983: 231). 
3.  This argument is most clearly elaborated in Stewart (1977). 
4.  These data are taken from de Valk (1992),  who does not cite his primary source. 
5.  See World Bank (1994).  This source does not however reveal the amount over 5 per cent 
by which the civil service grew over this period. 
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